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Introduction




I Familiar user interface
Change since late 70’s
I Computers coordinate and
monitor sensors
I Ca. 100MB of binary code
spread over 50 - 70 ECUs
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Objective of Computerization
Safety




I Automatic crash response
I Remote diagnostics
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Future Trends
Consolidation
Classic control applications are supplemented by new complex applications
on a single control unit
Proactive Systems
Prevent or mitigate critical situations
User Customization
App Store, let the user buy “upgrades”
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Challenges
Isolation
Assure spatial and timely isolation
New Attack Vectors
Future trends will open a wide range of attack vectors for attackers.
New Threats
Computerized environments bring new array of potential new threats.
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Architecture
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Architecture
L4 microkernel
I Tasks, Threads and IPC
I Object capabilities
Infrastructure layer with basic services
I Memory and IO manager
I Secure GUI
I Drivers
Reuse existing, collaboratively developed software
I OS rehosting
I Virtualization
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OS Rehosting
Adapt OS kernel to run as deprivileged user space task
Full binary compatibility at API level
Change hardware aware parts of the kernel
L4Linux
Current mainline version
Performance penalty between 2 and 20 percent compared to native
Intrusive modifications to Linux kernel required
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Virtualization
Almost no modifications to virtualized OS kernel required
With nested paging negligible performance impact
I up to 30 percent otherwise
Relies on hardware support
VT, SVM (and Trustzone)
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)
Only with nested paging (VTLB underway)
Slight modifications to guest kernel (custom virtualized devices)
Staged virtualization for faithfull virtualization
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Proof-of-Concept Implementation
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Proof-of-Concept Implementation
Intel Atom Z510 platform
@1.1GHz, 512MB RAM
Two instances of Android,
realtime AutoSAR task
One Android, one L4Linux with
Busybox, realtime AutoSAR
task
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Further Research
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Further Research
Scheduling
Integrate real-time, event driven scheduler with time driven schedule
Power Management
Power efficiency, consider power budget
MP / Multicore
Symetric and asymetric multicore systems
Virtualization
Inter VM communication, performance improvements, hybrid tasks
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Important Related Work
Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile
Koscher, Karl Czeskis, Alexei Roesner, Franziska Patel et al.
L4Cars
Kevin Elphinstone Gernot Heise Ralf Huuck Stefan M. Petters Sergio
Ruocco
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Thank you!
Matthias Langemlange {@} sec.t-labs.tu-berlin.de (TU BerlinSpring 2010 SIDAR - Graduierten Workshop ber Reaktive Sicherheit)A S cure and Reliable OS for Automotive ApplicationsCars on CodJuly 7th, 2010 19 / 19
